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The Supreme Court’s recent term decisions embody a troubling 
cultural shift in the way in which society views issues of inequality and 
discrimination.  The very existence of identity-based inequality and bias is 
questioned under this burgeoning post-oppression weltanschauung, which 
posits that modern society has moved beyond matters of racial, gender, 
sexual orientation, and class justice.  Under the post-oppression socio-political 
view, systemic and explicit discrimination is disregarded as aberrational in 
nature, while existing inequality is rationalized as reflecting natural 
outcomes. 1   The “normalization” of social inequality provides substantial 
legal, social, economic and cognitive benefits for holders of privilege.2 
 
And yet our society continues to struggle with issues of difference 
while disparities along racial, gender, and class lines endure and deepen.3  
The persistence of identity-based inequality and discrimination poses a 
cognitive-moral dilemma for those who hold the post-oppression worldview.  
The post-oppressionist’s belief that society has achieved a state of democratic 
equality of opportunity is disrupted by evidence of growing social inequality 
and discrimination.4  The artifice of race first developed as one socio-political 
tool to mediate this tension, by separating persons into categories legally 
sanctioned for discrimination and unequal treatment.5  Gender difference has 
also long been used to rationalize the unequal treatment of women,6 as have 
differences in sexual orientation 7 and class status. 8   The creation of the 
“other,” therefore, has historically been vital to attempts to rationalize the 
persistence of inequality.9 
 
1 See generally Christian B. Sundquist, Equal Opportunity, Individual Liberty and Meritocracy in 
Education: Reinforcing Structures of Privilege and Inequality, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & 
INEQUALITy 227 (2002). 
2 See Adrienne D. Davis & Stephanie Wildman, Language & Silence: Making Systems of Privilege 
Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 881 (1995). 
3 See Christian B. Sundquist, Genetics, Race and Substantive Due Process, 20 WASH. & LEE J. OF 
CIVIL RIGHTS & SOC. JUSTICE 341 (2014) (manuscript on file with author). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 See Donna Young, Working Across Borders: Global Restructuring and Women’s Work, 2001 UTAH 
L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2001). 
7 See generally Nancy Ota, Flying Buttresses, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 693 (2000). 
8 See generally Peter Halewood, Law’s Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal 
Property Rights, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1331 (1996). 
9 See Anthony Paul Farley, The Apogee of the Commodity, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1229, 1231-32 (2004). 
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Various conceptual vehicles have been utilized over time to perform 
the “normalization” function, including culture of poverty theories, classic 
market theories, equal opportunity doctrine, and familial ideology.10  The 
post-racial perspective is a more recent manifestation of the attempt to argue 
that this nation has moved beyond oppression.11  And yet the cognitive and 
moral desire felt by privilege holders to normalize inequality is not limited to 
matters of race.  Rather, the modern socio-judicial trend to normalize 
inequality is characterized by a spurious belief that society has altogether 
moved beyond matters of oppression- racial, economic, gender or otherwise.12    
 
The Court’s decisions during the most recent term embody this move 
beyond oppression. During the summer of 2013, the Court rolled back critical 
civil rights advances in the voting rights, 13 affirmative action,14 employer 
discrimination15 and criminal justice contexts.16  In Fisher v. Texas the Court 
made it much more difficult for educational institutions to consider race in 
admissions, 17 despite disturbing patterns of re-segregation and increasing 
racial disparities in higher education.18  In a pair of Title VII cases, the Court 
issued rulings that made it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in 
employment discrimination cases, speculating that heightened causation 
standards were necessary to reduce the “tempt[ation]” of racial minorities 
and women of making “unfounded charge[s] of… discrimination.”  19  The 
Court in Maryland v. King also held constitutional the forcible collection of 
DNA samples for persons merely arrested on suspicion of committing a crime, 
despite the fact that such collection disparately impacts racial minorities.20   
 
The Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder, however, is perhaps 
the most telling example of a judicial worldview that society has transcended 
10 See e.g., Brenda Grossman, Turning the Gaze Back on Itself, in ADRIEN WING GLOBAL CRITICAL 
RACE FEMINISM: AN INTERNATIONAL READER (2000), at 31 (discussing “familial ideology” and the 
ways in which law attempts to normalize gendered roles in the family). 
11 See generally Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589 (2009). 
12 See Farley, supra note 9, at 1240 (“equality is the most covert hiding place for, and the most 
effective mask of, oppression”). 
13 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013) (striking down Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 on Fifteenth Amendment and federalism grounds). 
14 Fisher v. Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013) (holding that educational institutions should receive no 
judicial deference concerning whether “the means chosen.to attain diversity are narrowly 
tailored”). 
15 Vance v. Ball, 133 S.Ct. 2434 (2013) and University of Texas v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517 (2013). 
16 Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958 (2013).  
17 Fisher v. Texas. 133 S.Ct. 2411. 
18 See generally Derek Black, Voluntary Desegregation, Resegregation, and the Hope for Equal 
Educational Opportunity, Hum. Rts., Vol. 38, Fall (2011). 
19 Nassar, 133 S.Ct. at 2532; see also Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2434. 
20 See Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. at 1970.  See also Sundquist, supra note 3. 
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structural problems of social inequality.  In Shelby County, the Court 
rendered the most vital section of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional.21  
Declaring that “[o]ur country has changed,” the majority deployed the post-
racial trope of “racial progress” to invalidate the centerpiece legislation of the 
Civil Rights Era.22  The Court’s use of post-racial language and reasoning 
abounds in this classic Roberts opinion: 
 
 “[t]here is no denying…that the conditions that originally 
justified the [Voting Rights Act] measures no longer 
characterize voting [conditions]”;23 
 “[n[early 50 years later, things have changed dramatically”;24 
 “[b]latantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are 
rare”;25 
 Reauthorization of the Act occurred “as if nothing had 
changed”;26 
 “the conditions justifying [the Voting Rights Act’s 
requirements] have dramatically improved”;27 
 “[t]here is no longer such a [racial] disparity” “justifying the 
preclearance remedy”:28 
 “[t]oday the Nation is no longer divided along those lines” (in 
terms of racial disparities in voting registration);29 
 “[t]he [Fifteenth] Amendment is not designed to punish for 
the past”;30 
 “[Congress] cannot rely simply on the past” (history of racial 
discrimination);31 
 “no one can fairly say that [the record] shows anything 
approaching the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’ and 
‘rampant’ discrimination that faced Congress in 1965”;32 
 “40-year-old facts hav[e] no logical relationship to the present 
day”;33 and 
21 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 2. 
24 Id. at 13. 
25 Id. at 14. 
26 Id. at 16. 
27 Id. at 16-17. 
28 Id. at 18. 
29 Id.  
30 Id. at 20. 
31 Id. 
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 “[o]ur country has changed, and while any racial 
discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure 
that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks 
to current conditions.”34 
 
As a result of the Shelby County decision, as well as the Court’s  
embrace of the post-racial narrative, states previously under federal review 
have begun to implement rigid voting requirements that likely will have the 
effect of disenfranchising scores of minority voters.35  As a result of the Fisher 
and Parents Involved decisions, educational institutions have found it 
increasingly difficult to respond to disturbing patterns of re-segregation.  As a 
result of the Maryland decision, racial disparities in criminal justice will 
likely increase as DNA samples can now be obtained upon mere arrest.  As a 
result of the Vance and Nassar cases, employees find it more difficult to 
redress racial and gender based discrimination.  Put simply, the Court’s 
recent term is emblematic of a broader trend to disregard the reality of 
continuing discrimination while adopting a worldview that has the effect of 
exacerbating identity-based disparities. 
 
How can we disrupt this burgeoning post-oppression and post-race 
worldview?  The essays contained in this special Shelby County volume of the 
Touro Journal of Race, Gender and Ethnicity may well point justice advocates 
in the right direction.  
 
34 Id. at 24. 
35See Jerry H. Goldfeder, After ‘Shelby County’ Ruling, Are Voting Rights Endangered?, Brennan 
Center for Justice (Sept. 23, 2013), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/after-
shelby-county-ruling-are-voting-rights-endangered) (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
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